Public Interest Groups (PIGs) and digital commons share many similarities. Although the commons predate by far the creation of the GIP status, and even more so its extension to all fields of activity, both concepts are now the object of growing interest on the part of public actors.

This renewed interest can be explained by the fact that digital commons and GIPs are two instruments that allow the public actor to meet several of its objectives: From these points of convergence has immersed the observation that the GIP could constitute a legal tool of choice at the service of the public actor wishing to structure a digital commons project that it would have initiated or joined.

• Pooling of material, financial and human resources necessary to carry out public service missions
• Collaboration with private actors in its territory; participatory democracy, etc.

In this first article, we :

• Let us propose a definition of each of these two notions
• Appreciate the relevance of the GIP as a legal tool for structuring digital commons projects

In defining the Public Interest Group and the digital commons, the convergence between these two concepts is obvious.

Definition of the public interest group, a structure adapted to a heterogeneous community

A public interest grouping (GIP) is a legal entity under public law with administrative and financial autonomy, resulting from an agreement approved by the State.

Through this agreement, the members agree to pool a set of resources (including agents made available or on secondment) for a specific purpose. The latter must respond to a non-profit mission of general interest.

Only open to legal entity members, the GIP can be composed of private law organizations even if it retains a strong attachment to public actors. Indeed, the GIP must include at least one public person and more than half of its capital or votes in the deliberative bodies must be held by public persons (or private persons with a public service mission).

Relatively flexible, the GIP can be formed without initial capital and can operate in all sectors of activity. Its public law status makes it a particularly popular instrument for public actors, and it can even be presented as the public law equivalent of the 1901 law association. Thus, since the extension of the scope of GIPs beyond the sole field of research in 2011, there have been more than 50 decrees approving constitutive agreements published in the Journal Officiel, although only GIPs with a national scope are subject to such publication.

The constitutive agreements of the non-national groups are approved by the prefect or another decentralized State authority and published in the collection of administrative acts of the prefecture concerned.

The GIP is the preferred tool for public actors wishing to pool resources and means, and seems to be the ideal way to structure a digital community project initiated or joined by such actors.

Référence : 1

Definition of the digital commons and challenges for public actors

Although the notion of digital commons is not precisely defined, it is now commonly used to refer to the idea of one or more digital resources produced and maintained collectively by a community of heterogeneous actors, according to self-defined rules of governance that ensure their democratic and open character. Today, the digital commons are increasingly mobilized by public actors, and particularly by local authorities. Whether they initiate them or join pre-existing projects, local authorities see the digital commons as innovative tools for renewing public services and strengthening participatory democracy, but also as a means of pooling resources between local authorities and even between public actors.

The GIP has many advantages in the context of the support or structuring of a digital community project.

Ease of creation

The legislator's ability to create a GIP without initial capital makes it an easy tool to create, while its loose legal regime allows for a great deal of freedom in drafting the statutes. Thus, the GIP makes it easy to create a common governance structure that allows it to collaborate with associative and industrial actors, in addition to public actors.

Statutory freedom

The legal regime of the GIP is quite succinct and refers to the statutes for the essential organization and governance of the latter. This ensures that the community retains control over the definition of the rules of governance of the pool. Indeed, with the exception of the rules applicable to accounting and personnel,1 the rules applicable to the GIP are determined entirely by the constitutive agreement, which offers great flexibility in the management and operation of the grouping. The only obligations are that the GIP must be organized around a general assembly of members and a director. The general assembly takes by default any decision relating to the administration of the grouping; whereas the director ensures, under the authority of the general assembly, the operation of the GIP.

Non-profit purpose

Finally, the non-profit nature of the grouping guarantees that any profits will be devoted to the development and maintenance of the resource, thus constituting a factor of security for the sustainability of the commons. While these points have the advantage of demonstrating the proximity between GIP and the digital commons, they paradoxically constitute limits to the relevance of the GIP as a structure for carrying the commons

However, the relevance of the GIP as a structure for supporting a digital commons project suffers from a few irritants, which should be identified and addressed as soon as possible in order to ensure maximum security for the digital commons.

An imperfect legislative framework to ensure the sustainability of the common

The ease of creating the GIP is accompanied by two weaknesses. The first is that the GIP cannot have as members individuals who are present in their individual capacity. It therefore does not allow citizens to participate directly in the governance of the community. However, the GIP can perfectly well have an association of citizens as members.

The second weakness lies in the ability to create a GIP without capital, which may prove detrimental in the medium term to the development of an economic model and the search for partners.

A great deal of contractual freedom that creates legal uncertainty

The legal obligations of the GIP are minimal. This can obviously be an advantage in the definition of a tailor-made governance, but it can also be detrimental to the community. Indeed, this great freedom does not offer potential members or partners a clear visibility of the functioning of the GIP, who will have to take the time to consult the constitutive agreement in order to ensure the good governance of the GIP before any partnership or membership.

Internally, the great freedom allowed in the drafting of the statutes can become an irritant, leading to overly heavy governance that paralyzes the GIP; or conversely, overly flexible governance that allows one stakeholder to take control of the entire resource and the common good.

Lack of a business model

Finally, the non-profit nature of the project limits the possibility of developing an economic model that ensures the sustainability of the community. The parties involved in the GIP will therefore have to be innovative in order to develop a relevant and sustainable economic model, drawing on the funding they can mobilize individually.

These few points of friction must be addressed without overshadowing the strengths and advantages of the GIP in structuring and carrying digital commons. And this is all the more true since easily implementable solutions can be deployed to overcome them!

Below, 2 articles dedicated to :

• Management of the common / the economic model of the GIP 
• Governance and legal structure of the GIP